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In the last three decades, transport economists and geographers have published an array of 
studies on port institutions and governance. Many of these publications emphasize the role of 
institutions in enabling or inhibiting port efficiencies, port competition (inter and intra) and the 
development of a port’s resources and capabilities.  
Political instabilities and their consequential economic lags have to some extent misaligned the 
pace of institutional reforms in Southern African ports compared with ports in the developed 
world. Some ports in this region (South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Mauritius and 
Madagascar) have however, over the last 10 to15 years begun to follow the port reform trend, 
and as such have undergone various degrees of institutional reform. This work seeks to provide a 
detailed case study which discloses a holistic overview of recent and on-going institutional 
reforms of Southern African ports from two perspectives. Firstly, by assessing the extent to which 
institutional structures have shaped and mediated port development in Southern Africa. 
Secondly, by conducting a port institutional positioning comparison between a range of North 
European and Southern African container ports in order to determine how similarly Southern 
African ports resemble more established first world ports. Southern African ports effectively 
present a unique case of mixed port institutional development trends compared to those in more 
developed regions of the world. As such, this case study reinforces the fact that different port 
institutional structures are locally embedded and do matter in port competition, and that 
institutional reform has supported port development to varying degrees.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last three decades, transport economists and geographers have published an array of 
studies on port institutions and governance. It will be demonstrated in the next section that many 
of these publications emphasize the role of institutions in enabling or inhibiting port efficiencies, 
port competition (inter and intra) and the development of a port’s resources and capabilities.  
Political instability and their consequential economic lags have to some extent misaligned the 
pace of institutional reforms in Southern African ports compared with ports in the developed 
world. Some ports in this region (South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Mauritius and 
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Madagascar) have, however, over the last 10 years begun to follow the port reformation trend 
and as such undergone various degrees of institutional reform.  
Given Southern Africa’s importance (the region constitutes 41% of Africa’s container 
throughput ), this study seeks to provide a detailed case study which: (1) Discloses a holistic 
overview of recent and on-going institutional reforms of Southern African ports; (2) Provides 
understanding as to what extent institutional structures have shaped and mediated port 
development in Southern Africa and (3) Compares the current institutional position between a 
range of Southern African and North European container ports. 
Our paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the theoretical background describing 
what port institutional arrangements are, as well as why and how they evolve. Section three 
consolidates the literature discussed and presents the research methodology and analytical 
framework for application to Southern African port institutions (introduced in section 4). Section 
five applies the analytical framework to the case addressing the research question in three 
separate discussions. First, a high level indication of the extent of port institutional variation in 
the region is disclosed. Second, a more detailed discussion of each port’s institutional 
development path follows which zooms in on each path’s critical junctures points (effectively 
main drivers of port institutional reform in the region). Finally the institutional position of 
Southern African ports is compared to a selection of five ports of the Hamburg- Le Havre range 
in northern Europe in order to determine which Southern African ports most resemble these 
more mature/ developed ports.   
Southern African ports effectively present a unique case of mixed port institutional development 
trends compared to developed regions of the world. As such, this case study reinforces the fact 
that different port institutional structures do matter in port competition and that institutional 
reform has supported port development to varying degrees. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Defining Port Institutions  
Notteboom et al. (2013) describe institutions as the humanly devised and or socially constructed 
sets of rules that constrain and enable human interaction. Aligned to this definition, Roland 
(2004) defines institutions as constraints on behaviour imposed by ‘rules of the game’. Gertler 
(2004) characterises institutions as having formal regulations, legislation, economic systems as 
well as informal societal norms that regulate the behaviour of economic actors. This comprises 
firms, managers, investors and workers which effectively all define the system of rules that shape 
the attitudes, values and expectations of individual economic actors. North (1991) succinctly 
describes the mechanics of institutions as rules of the game in society that shape and constrain 
the behaviour of economic agents.  
Port management models to a certain extent define the rules of the game between players in a 
port context. A simplified typology of port management models, which effectively categorises a 
port’s ‘rules of the game’ with respect to functional responsibility, is disclosed in table 1.  
In a comparative case study of port governance in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, 
India and Canada, Brooks (2004) finds the WBRTK typology of ports too simple an approach. The 
main criticism relates mainly to the fact that the WBPRTK does not provide guidance to a 
government faced with pressure to devolve port administration in terms of the application of 
each approach given the country specific (or local) situation. This notion holds true especially 
for ports in developing countries which operate in a significantly different economic and social 
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Table 1. Typology of Port Ownership WBPRTK Models 
Port Type Infrastructure Superstructure Port labour Other functions 
Public service port  Public Public Public Majority public 
Tool port  Public Public Private Public/private 
Landlord port  Public Private Private Public/private 
Private service port  Private Private Private Majority public 
 
Source: World Bank (2007) 
2.2. Why do Port Institutions change? 
Roland (2004) distinguishes between fast-moving and slow-moving institutions in which a ‘fast 
change’ can be spurred on by a revolution and a ‘slow-change’ driven by changes in social 
norms. According to Debrie et al. (2013) the act of reforming port institutions implies the 
implementation of a public policy to change specific actions and coordination structures, most 
commonly at the national level. Hall (2003) asserts that the trajectory of institutional change is 
reflective of both the local political economy and the role of public officials in deliberating over 
formal institutional choices in the face of considerable uncertainty. Notteboom and Winkelmans 
(2001) argued that most changes in port institutions relate to a retreat or at least a redefinition of 
the role of the public sector in ports through privatisation, commercialisation and corporatisation 
schemes. The retreat of government flourishes in the belief that an enterprise-based economy 
would allow for greater flexibility and efficiency in the market (e.g. through higher competition) 
and a better response to consumers’ demands. Some reasons for institutional changes are as 
follows:  
• To prevent market failure 
The conventional assumption in a market economy is that competitive forces will ensure the 
efficient allocation of resources. Market failure is seen as a prime reason for public intervention in 
ports, and thus a strong incentive for not aiming for a full retreat from government in ports 
(Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001). Failure of the competitive market mechanisms results in 
three forms of market failure as outlined by Vining and Boardman (2008). Such market failures 
include: the existence of public goods, imperfect competition and externalities. These failures 
necessitate and justify market intervention. Public goods are defined by Suykens and Van De 
Voorde (1998), as `those goods and services that could or probably never be supplied sufficiently 
or satisfactorily by a competitive industry, or might not be supplied by them at all.’ Vining and 
Boardman (2008) discusses the economic principals of non-rivalrous and non-excludable 
properties associated with port infrastructure. They also advocate the existence of public goods 
as a motive for government intervention in the provision of port infrastructure at a socially 
optimum price. Imperfect competition in a port context pertains to a port’s existence as a natural 
monopoly. The scarce existence of ‘natural ports’ (e.g. in terms of location) and the large capital 
costs and economies of scale deter entry of new incumbents and result in the formation of a port 
as a natural monopoly. Positive externalities can result from port projects that can (for example) 
be combined with corridors to form a network. These network externalities may result from 
economies of scale or economies of density (increase of benefits as the distance between nodes 
increases). Negative externalities as a result of port activity can also be observed through 
congestion and pollution. Vining and Boardman (2008) provide a typology of public intervention 
for the provision of physical and intangible port infrastructure depending on the level of market 
failure (under severe, moderate and low market failure). In such cases, repairing the market 
failure can only be achieved through port institutional changes. Baird (2004) argues, however, 
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that ports are increasingly regarded as regular services as opposed to public goods. This implies 
that the cost recovery principle is therefore justified for ports. 
• To seek new sources of investment finance 
The growth in containerization has led to larger vessels which have necessitated deeper and 
wider port channels, larger stack port terminals and more efficient port handling equipment and 
technology (to name a few). Such investments come at a significant cost and often a significant 
burden to the state. In her discussion of port reform in developing countries, Niekerk (2005) 
states that the intention of port reform is to create stand-alone businesses that are financially 
viable. Financial imperatives for investment funding include affordability, a suitable return on 
investment (if any) and an appropriate risk assessment. Developing countries confronted with 
rapid economic growth often face scarcity of government funding for projects such as port 
developments which are required to align investment levels with projected demand. Such 
scarcity necessitates the need for more creative funding strategies such as: foreign 
lenders/foreign aid, private partner investors or perhaps even the sale (partial or complete) of 
port property to the private sector. These different funding mechanisms will ultimately require a 
change to the ‘rules of the game’ or port institutions thereby permitting the devolution of ports, 
and ‘reducing the financial burden of the state’ (Debrie et al., 2007).  
• To seek a higher efficiency and effectiveness 
Institutions (rules of the game) are characteristically restrictive and as such, constraints can 
inhibit the efficiency levels and effectiveness of a port. In their study assessing port governance 
models, Brooks and Pallis (2008) link governance decisions and a port authority’s aligned 
structure and strategy fit as the input to an optimal port performance (output). This resultant 
output goal (after a transition period) is both efficient and effective to internal and external 
stakeholders. Tongzon and Ganesalingam (1994) divide efficiency measures into two broad 
categories: operational efficiency and customer-oriented measures. Their study proposes 
bringing effectiveness into the measurement of performance in a greater way than has been done 
to date. Marlow and Paixão (2003) identified the importance of measuring port effectiveness in 
the context of a ‘lean port’ and the need for agility in a highly competitive environment. Cheon et 
al. (2010) evaluate how port institutional reforms influenced efficiency gains of 98 ports between 
1991 and 2004 applying the Malmquist productivity index. The authors argue that examining the 
sources of efficiency gains provides a foundation for reforms of port strategies and institutions in 
the long term. The results of their quantitative study did, however, reject the premise that as 
ports have become more decentralized in corporate structure, they have acquired higher 
efficiency gains. They cite improvement in total factor productivity of world container ports 
largely from the reforms of ownership structure and asset management practices, rather than 
through decentralization and corporatization at the port-authority level. The results of Cheon, et 
al. (2010) are also reinforced by the work of Chang (2011) which refutes the notion that causality 
runs from institutions/ institutional change to development improvement and asserts this causal 
relationship to be simplistic, linear, and static. In a port context the results of Cheon et al. ( 2010) 
and the hypotheses of Chang (2011) highlight the possible misconception that port efficiency 
gains  follow institutional change. 
• To exploit windows of opportunity/locational opportunity 
Jacobs and Notteboom (2011) discuss the role of territorial institutions and strategic action in 
opening windows of opportunity at different competing locations. In their study they present 
three case studies within the Rhine-Scheldt Delta. The results demonstrate that a process of 
regional evolution took place, when a window of opportunity at one location triggers a response 
at another location. The findings show that a combination of (missed) windows of opportunities 
and ‘critical junctures’ creates a distinctive path of institutional development among ports. 
• To seek the appropriate institutional ‘fit’  
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In their respective management studies, Mintzberg (1990), Venkatraman (1989) and Grant 
(2009:276) emphasise the need for ‘fit’ between the environment, the governance model, the 
organisational strategy and the resources and capabilities of the organisation as an imperative for 
efficient and effective operations. De Langen and Van der Lugt’s (2007) framework of strategic fit 
applied to port authorities shows the embeddedness of port governance  with the  environment, 
strategy, resources and capabilities. This framework was used to analyse three Dutch ports at 
both a port cluster and port authority level. The objective was to ultimately identify the 
appropriate institutional fit given influences from environment, the strategic position and 
resources/capabilities of the ports. Changes in the port environment have led to considerable 
changes in the governance models of ports (Brooks, 2004). This further emphasises the point that 
seeking the appropriate environmental fit can be executed by institutional changes. Notteboom 
and Winkelmans (2001) discuss the correct management fit for port organisations. The authors 
cite political management structures as an impediment of many public port organisations. These 
political management structures prevent ports from developing enough flexibility and versatility 
to cope with increased productivity requirements and innovation in order to respond adequately 
to structural changes in the world economy. Seeking the appropriate organisational or human 
resource fit for a port authority could be achieved through institutional change. In their 
commentary on institutions in evolutionary geography, Boschma and Frenken (2009) state that 
when institutions generally do not fit with the specific features of a new economy, institutions 
are created to support, sustain and further grow the new industry. 
2.3 How do institutions change/develop? : Factors shaping the Institutional Development path time 
continuum. 
• Institutional path dependence 
‘Yes, institutions do evolve in a manner that shares important attributes with biological processes 
of evolution’ (David, 1994:217). There are essentially two rationales guiding institutional path 
dependence, namely an evolutionary and institutional perspective. Table 2 provides the two 
economic perspectives of path dependence which impact institutional change (Evolutionary and 
Institutional). The Institutional developmental path of a port is influenced either by group 
behaviour providing structural constraints, being locked into a specific path or the emergence of 
economic, macrostructure from micro-events and behaviours. 
In their discussion on the four phases of path dependence, Martin and Simmie (2008) propose a 
pre-formation, path creation, path dependence (where lock in occurs) and finally a path decay 
phase. In the final phase of path dependence (path decay), there is a loss of momentum and 
eventual path dissolution along the institutional development path. This phase can be attributed 
to reasons such as, a rise in external competition, the purposeful abandonment of a particular 
path and negative lock in. A critical juncture event, for example a change from a 
planned/command like economy to a more market economy, provides an opportunity for 
institutional change to a new institutional development path, thereby decaying the current path. 
• Devolution of ports 
Various scholars have defined devolution broadly as the transfer of responsibilities from a state 
authority towards the private sector. This is done so either directly through a sale or concession 
agreement, or the sharing of responsibilities (Brooks, 2007; Cullinane and Song, 2002; Hoffman, 
2002; Thomas, 1994). The devolution of ports is founded on the belief that, ‘the private market is 
an efficient means of allocating resources’ (Brooks, 2007). This is essentially based on the premise 
that the public sector is simply too bureaucratic and lacks the agile management style required to 
cope with the demands of the fast paced global shipping and logistics environment. Notteboom 
and Winkelmans (2001) argue that public port companies that are operating in a competitive 
market environment without any government shelter and based on a commercial/non-politicised 
management style are not necessarily less efficient than private ones when confronted with the 
same environment and organisational structure. 
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Table 2. Path Dependence Rationales 
Source: Adapted from David, 1985; Notteboom et al.,  2013; Martin & Sunley, 2006; Arthur, 1989; North, 1991; 
Setterfield, 1993. 
 
Removing terminal assets and operational functions from government hands allows specialized 
entities to concentrate on terminal operations and cargo handling services (Cheon et al., 2010). 
Globally devolution has occurred in large and small ports and also at various levels within the 
port, i.e. operator, stevedore, port labour, etc. Although the intention to devolve port activities 
has similar motives, the results (depending on the measure used) globally have been mixed. 
Cheon et al. (2010) looked at the total factor productivity changes (MPI) of 98 devolved ports over 
13 years and demonstrated an improvement for 83 and a decrease in efficiency for 15 ports. 
Debrie et al. (2007) revisited port devolution cases of ports in France and Canada drawing 
attention to challenges confronting small ports following the devolution process. These include 
financial limitations and scale conflicts between regional and central governments over port 
planning and development. 
• Public Private Partnerships (PPP)  
PPP in the port industry is typically centred around a devolution process whereby the public 
sector seeks financial and operational partnerships with the private sector. According to Hodge 
and Greve (2007) scholars have been divided in their thinking of PPP. This is between the belief 
of PPP as a governance tool (changing the rules of the game) and others who believe that PPP is 
simply a language game. In both cases, PPPs are connected with infrastructure projects and are 
institutional arrangements for cooperation between the public and private sector. Given the risk 
and cost associated with huge infrastructure projects, PPPs are also seen as ﬁnancial models that 
3 Refer the works of David (1985) – QWERTY economics whereby the early development of the QWERTY 
keyboard led to it becoming the standard keyboard in use. That technology locked the industry into QWERTY. 
Evolutionary Economics Institutional Economics 
Path Dependence and ‘Lock In’ 
perspective  (David, 1985; 
Notteboom et al.,  2013; Martin & 
Sunley, 2006  ) 
Dynamic Increasing Returns (DIR) 
Perspective (Arthur, 1989; Martin & 
Sunley, 2006) 
Institutional Hysteresis (lagging) 
(North, 1991; Setterfield 1993) 
Evolutionary economists view lock 
in from a perspective of routines 
with lock in being attributed to 
technology3 (David, 1985). An 
example of lock in in a port context 
is the container. This led to 
standardisation, palletized cargo 
(even some minerals are now being 
containerised). Inter-modality (and 
such routines) all spurred on by the 
containerisation ‘lock in’. 
The role of various forms of 
increasing returns in generating 
path dependence in the economy. 
Premise is that small events cannot 
sway the outcome, however under 
increasing returns, many outcomes 
are possible. DIR is concerned with 
not just only technological 
evolution and ‘lock in’ but also the 
emergence of economic, 
macrostructure from micro-events 
and behaviours, that is with ‘self 
organisation’ (Arthur, 1989).  
Path dependence viewed from the 
perspective of institutional change. 
Institutions are ultimately a 
product of individual and group 
behaviour – recognizing the role of 
institutions as structural 
constraints.  
Institutions of an economy are best 
thought of as evolving, non- 
optimal and path-dependent 
phenomena. Paths can be changed 
abruptly by revolutions, external 
shocks or incremental adaptation 
and deliberate design.  
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enable the public sector to make use of private ﬁnance capital. The alternative view of PPP as a 
language game, uses PPP as a ‘game designed to cloud’ other strategies and purposes. This view 
sees PPP merely as a watered down version of privatisation or outsourcing. Farlam (2005) sees 
PPP as finance model development. The state shares risk and responsibility with private firms 
but ultimately retains control of assets, while avoiding some of the ‘pitfalls’ of privatisation 
(unemployment, higher prices and corruption). In terms of suitability, Vining and Boardman 
(2008) argue that PPP is only likely to work for port physical infrastructure with moderate levels 
of market failure. Moderate market failure in a port context refers to instances where there is 
moderate competition, the port is small to medium in size, the port is a regional port, there are 
moderate up-front costs, and there is a potential public good problem.  
• Institutional plasticity (layering; stretching and conversion)  
Physicists and engineers refer to plasticity as the propensity of a material to undergo permanent 
deformation under load. From an institutional context, the processes and modes of institutional 
change within a given path are still insufficiently understood (Stambach 2010:411). The 
evolutionary economic concept of path ‘lock in’ and ‘de-locking’ to some extent has constrained 
institutional path evolution to exogenous influences (negative or positive.) MacKinnon (2009), 
Notteboom et al. (2013) and Strambach (2010) agree in the need for raised awareness with respect 
to the influence of transformative capacities of agency in the process of institutional change. 
Mindfulness of different transformative process (not limited to ‘lock in’) was introduced by 
Strambach (2010) in order to explain a situation where a range of alternative development 
trajectories are possible. These alternative developments could be realized without necessarily 
breaking out of the existing institutional path in order to reach an alternative development 
trajectory. Notteboom et al. (2013) state that institutional plasticity allows for incremental 
institutional transformations. However such incremental changes will not necessarily result in a 
break with the existing path of development. Institutional plasticity transformations are exhibited 
in three forms namely, conversion, layering and stretching (Table 3). 
Table 3. Three forms of Institutional plasticity 
Conversion Layering Stretching 
The alteration of existing 
institutions to serve new 
purposes or functions. 
Conversion can be 
achieved through the 
abandonment of existing 
layers or realignment of 
arrangements without the 
addition of new rules or 
procedures. 
A gradual process 
achieved by the addition 
of new rules or 
procedures to existing 
institutions, or by the 
addition of new functions. 
Each new ‘layer’ 
constitutes a small 
change. However, the 
cumulative effect can lead 
to a mutation of the 
institution on the same 
path. 
This occurs when actors 
cannot change existing 
arrangements and 
essentially apply 
flexibility and dynamism 
within the existing 
institution. 
Source: Adapted from Notteboom et al. (2013), Martin (2010) and Strambach (2010) 
Is institutional plasticity perhaps just another form of the dynamic increasing returns (DIR) and 
Institutional Hysteresis perspectives (IHP) of institutional path dependence? (refer to table 2). 
Like the plasticity view, both DIR and IHP also argue path evolution either by radical (shift in 
path) or through incremental means (development of macrostructure from microstructure or the 
re-organization of groups/agents without changing the rules of the game). Therefore, 
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incremental changes within the DIR and IHP views can exhibit the same results/ characteristics 
as institutional plasticity. 
• Through economic resilience of regions  
According to Simmie and Martin (2010), the idea of regional economic resilience refers to the 
ability of a local socio-economic system to re-cover from a shock or disruption. Hill et al. (2008) 
refer to resilience as the ability of a region to recover from shocks which remove or potentially 
remove the region from its growth path. The relative resilience to shocks, i.e. the sensitivity to 
shocks and the recovery (response times), are therefore an important consideration impacting 
port institutional development, particularly in developing economies. The tenacity of a region to 
remain, bounce back or move to a higher yielding equilibrium institutional path, effectively 
constrains or enables the extent to which ‘lock in’ or ‘de-locking’ of institutional path 
developments can occur. This hinges on the assumption/applies to cases whereby an external 
shock is required to ‘un-lock’ an equilibrium yielding developmental path (David, 2005). Simmie 
and Martin (2010) measure resilience as a regions ‘susceptibility’ to be moved off its equilibrium 
path. From an institutional economic perspective, resilience can be viewed as a form of path 
‘lock in/ de-locking’ elasticity. 
2.4 Port regulation 
‘In leading ports, regulation of private sector service providers has been minimized by ensuring 
an adequate level of competition’ (van Niekerk2002:12). In the absence of adequate competition 
however, the role of an independent regulator becomes critical in safeguarding against anti-
competitive behaviour potentially yielded by ‘dominant’ ports. The establishment of such a 
regulatory function is generally guided by a formal written enactment of a legislative authority 
(statute). The level (national, ministerial, port authority) at which port regulations are adopted 
will vary depending on the national port governance model. For example, port regulations in 
France and Italy reside at the ministerial level and in Rotterdam at the Port Authority level. All 
three are however also still subject to EU competition regulations. According to Farrell (2013) the 
objectives of port regulations depend on the policy environment. If government policy seeks 
greater competition, the objectives of the regulator overall would be to remove barriers to 
competition and facilitate transition to competitive markets. If government policy is not 
competition seeking, the regulatory objectives are then to generate outcomes similar to those 
which would be achieved by competition in situations where competition is impossible. This can 
be achieved (albeit more reactively) by monitoring industry performance, enforcing 
accountability, protecting consumers and ensuring fair prices. A discussion on the port 
regulatory position adopted at each of the Southern African ports in this case will follow at 5.1.  
3. Methodology 
The objective of this study is to provide a qualitative analysis of port institutional path 
development applied to Southern African container ports. Case study research is a useful 
research method for a thorough analysis of a specific situation (Van den Berg & De Langen 2011). 
Yin (1994) advocates case study research for the purpose of testing existing theory. Lee (1999) 
advises that case study research is best suited for the examination of why and how real-life 
(organizational) phenomena occur, but under conditions where researchers have minimum 
control. Mouton (2001) describes case research as being best suited for a small number of cases 
and also cites business and regional studies as typically applicable. The case selected comprises 
(and is limited to) the Southern African container ports of Maputo, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Cape 
Town, Walvis Bay, Port Louis and Toamasina. These are ports with varying capacity, have the 
same cargo operation (containers) and are located in the same region. 
Figure 1 graphically consolidates the literature discussed in section two in order to provide the 
theoretical or conceptual basis with which the institutional development path in southern African 
ports will be analysed. In a given port system, the institutional development path can be viewed 
  
EJTIR 15(4), 2015, pp.506-535  514        
Fraser and Notteboom 
Institutional Development Paths in Seaports: The Southern African Case 
 
over a time continuum (X axis) relative to the growth/ development of the port (Y axis). The 
underlying assumption is that the institutional development path of a port authority will always seek to 
achieve the highest institutional equilibrium – from the multiple institutional equilibrium paths 
available (E1 to E4). For the purpose of our analysis we define an institutional equilibrium path 
as the most appropriate port institution for optimum port development. To illustrate, at position 
A, the port endeavours to reach E3 (an institutional position which yields higher 
growth/development over the period of time. By exercising institutional resilience, the port 
authority can stay on the path gradually reaching E3 (B – a position close to but not on E3). A 
critical juncture point such as a political/economic shock or intolerable market failure, however, 
could pull the port authority away from its equilibrium development path, displacing or de-
locking it to a point such as C.   
 
Figure 1. Institutional Development Path Trend (own elaboration based on literature review) 
 
At this lower equilibrium development position, the port authority (depending on the level of 
resilience) will once again seek a higher institutional equilibrium for its development. If an 
institutional change such as devolution for example cannot be achieved due to structural (e.g. 
political constraints) then the port authority might exercise plasticity (D). In seeking a suitable 
institutional fit towards a greater institutional equilibrium path, the port authority might alter 
existing rules (conversion), add some new procedures (layering) or apply some flexibility 
(stretching). This would all be achieved while remaining within the same institutional 
framework. 
The conceptual theoretical framework presented in Figure 1 will be applied as the tool used to 
qualitatively analyse institutional variation and institutional path development in our case study. 
Our two research questions are: 
RQ1: What is the extent of institutional development path variation among Southern African ports?  and 
RQ2: To what extent have port institutional structures shaped and mediated port development among 
Southern African Ports? 
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From the (1) literature review, (2) observation of past international port reform cases and (3) 
general principles of good corporate governance, we observe that port reform has effectively 
impacted three main dimensions of a port authority. Firstly, the ownership structure (public, 
private and hybrid), secondly the core port authority functions (the regulator, landlord, 
waterside and operator function). Third, the governance practices of the port such as 
transparency and accountability and segregation of duties. Our final analysis is a comparative 
overview of the ownership structure and port authority functional variation between Southern 
African container ports and European ports in the Hamburg La Havre range. Port authority 
ownership structure and the extent to which critical port functions/services are separated from 
the port authority are the principal comparative factors applied in order to understand 
differences between Southern African and Northern European institutional ports. A comparison 
between Southern African and European port institutional arrangements is relevant to this study 
for various reasons. The European port system’s maritime heritage (which dates back to as early 
as the 15th century) demonstrates the region’s enduring and established track record as a 
maritime authority for developing ports. Southern Africa’s colonial heritage has also resulted in 
some of the region’s countries adopting legal principles and institutional arrangements from their 
former European colonists. The extent of this today with respect to port institutional 
arrangements however, requires further investigation. Finally, trade, development and co-
operation agreements (such as the liberalisation schedules completed in 2012) established a free 
trade area that covers 90% of bilateral trade between the EU and South Africa. South Africa is by 
far the strongest of sub-Saharan Africa's economies with export volumes to the EU growing and 
their composition becoming more diverse. (EU, 2012). Negotiations with the EU are now focused 
on reaching a comprehensive and regionally inclusive agreement with the entire South African 
Development Community (SADC). This will further strengthen trade between the two regions 
and increase European interest in southern African port activities. 
For our analysis, we will position each port in terms of the extent of port ownership (public/ 
private) relative to the extent core port functions are separated from the port authority itself. The 
latter (port functions) will be analysed in terms of the port regulatory, port waterside and port 
operator functions. This framework is also consistent with the alternative port classification 
approach advocated by Brooks (2004) in response to the more simplistic World Bank topology of 
ports. Our framework however extends the degree of ownership analysis in order to obtain a 
greater view of the private or public ownership position in conjunction with any devolvement of 
services.   
Figure 2 illustrates the analysis tool which will provide an aggregated position of each port for 
comparative purposes. We will compare each port’s position relative to the three extremes 
presented in figure 2, i.e. ownership structure, governance and the extent of port core functional 
separation of services. A,B,C and D represent positions dominated by a combination of (extreme) 
ownership structures or extremely unevenly separated port functions:  
• A = Zero government ownership with all main port functions separated from the port 
authority (private landlord);  
• B = Zero government ownership with one authority performing all port functions 
(private service port); 
• C = 100% government ownership with all main port functions separated from the port 
authority (public landlord); 
• D = 100% government ownership with one authority performing all port functions 
(public service port).  
Central in figure 2 as a reference point is balanced port reform, i.e. a perfectly balanced port 
institutional arrangement with 50% government ownership in each sphere of the port and 50% 
separation of port functions away from the port authority. Balanced port reform from this 
perspective is not proposed as the end goal for all ports, as each individual port’s institutional 
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positioning will be dependent on, ‘the country specific (or local) situation’ (Brooks, 2004).. After 
government ownership and the extent to which port functions are separated from the port 
authority has been established for each port, we will be able to position each port for analysis 
purposes. This analysis tool will then provide a concise indication on the Southern African port 
institutional positioning relative to the north European ports - the basis of our comparative 
analysis and third research question: 
 
 
Figure 2.  Port Institutional Positioning framework 
 
RQ3: How aligned are Southern African ports compared to a set of EU ports within the Hamburg Le 
Havre range in terms of their respective port institutional positioning?    
Our analysis consists of three steps. Firstly, all available and relevant port data/documents will 
be collated and analysed. The data is predominantly secondary and ranges from annual reports, 
strategic plans, corporate presentations, and available port statistics. Telephonic interviews 
(primary data) will be conducted in order to obtain clarity or confirmation of information where 
necessary. Second, the information obtained is categorised and allocated to the relevant section in 
accordance with the institutional framework. Third, the categorised information is reconciled 
against port institutional theory and conclusions for all ports are consolidated in order to 
determine the overall institutional development path and institutional variation in the region (see 
framework in figure 1). The discussion will be limited to the institutional arrangements of 
container ports in the region. It will also not include an evaluation of the causal relationship 
between institutional changes and port productivity improvements. 
4. Case Overview: Background 
Following the theoretical review on port institutional development and a discussion on the 
methodology, this section provides a background on the port authorities analysed in this study. 
Figure 3 shows the regional positioning of the Southern African container ports together with the 
container handling capacity of each port. Table 4 provides an overview of each port authority, the 
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Figure 3. Southern African Ports and Container Operations                                                          
(Source: Map adapted from www.saplacestours.com , port capacity at 2011)  
Table 4. Southern African Port Authorities and container ports 
Country Port Authority Container Ports Port Type & Ownership 
South Africa National Port Authority, a 






Service Port Tool Port 
Hybrid. 
The port Authority is a 
division of the separate 
legal entity Transnet, a 
public company with the 
South African 
government as the only 
shareholder. Transnet also 
holds the container 
operations (via TPT) and 
rail operations (via TFR) 
Namibia Namport Port Authority Walvis Bay & Lüderitz Tool Port, state owned 
enterprise. 
Mozambique The Port Authority (PA) 
Division of MPDC 
Maputo & Matola Private Port 
A National private 
company  
Madagascar Société de Gestion du Port 
Autonome de Toamasina 
(SPAT) 
Toamasina Landlord Port (PPP) 
Mauritius Mauritius Port Authority 
(MPA) 
Port Louis Tool/Service Port hybrid, 
government owned.  
 
(Source: Authors own Elaboration) 
5. Application of the Institutional Development Framework 
This section presents the results of the analysis performed on the basis of the presented 
methodological framework. Section 5.1 provides a high-level overview of the extent of current 
port institutional variation in the region. Section 5.2 analyses each port’s institutional path 
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trajectory, highlighting the salient critical junctures which necessitated past and current 
institutional reform. This section also points to possible future critical junctures based on current 
trends and issues faced by the ports today which might necessitate further institutional changes. 
Section 5.3 applies the port reform positioning framework in order to disclose the extent of port 
institutional variation between Southern African and European ports. Section 5.4 discusses the 
main findings resulting from the comparison among ports on a regional and European level.  
5.1 Extent of port institutional variation in the region 
Figure 4 depicts a summary of the extent of institutional variation among the region’s ports. For 
comparative purposes, this has been divided by the extent of public participation at the 
government, port regulatory (PR), port authority4 (PA) and port operator (PO) level. Each port 
has also been assigned a ‘tier’. This is done according to the level of segregation and private 
participation at each port’s regulatory and functional level (tier 1 to 4). 
Namport (T1), MPA (T2) and TNPA (T3) are ports with the highest levels of public participation 
(100%). TNPA and MPA are both separate legal government entities and similarly have separately 
devolved container port operations with government as the shareholder. Namport however, is one 
port entity with a mandate to run the port authority and container operations. With respect to 
regulatory responsibilities Namport and MCA both assume the role of both regulator and port 
authority, presenting some  governance issues with respect to autonomy and neutrality. TNPA 
however is regulated by a separate regulatory authority (although still a government entity).   
The ports at level T1 to T3 in figure 4 exist on the notion that the port is of national interest and 
provides social and economic benefits for the countries’ citizens. This is the dominant factor 
‘locking’ these ports into the public service or tool port institutional framework. Given the 
capacity, customer and strategic business requirements, however, this framework may no longer 
‘fit’ and provide the sustainable outcomes required. The ports at tiers T4 (Maputo) and T5 
(Toamasina) have undergone the greatest amount of institutional reform in the last 10 to 15 years. 
As a result, both ports have the least amount of public participation compared with the T1, T2 
and T3 ports. Notably, the institutional development paths of the T4 and T5 ports have therefore 
had more juncture points which presented windows of opportunity for port reform to occur and 
subsequently permitted private sector investment. 
 
4 Note: The discussion is limited to the container sector. 
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Figure 4. Institutional variation of Southern African Ports                                                                                 
note: port regulation (PR), port authority function (PA) and port operations (PO)                                                                                         
source: Own elaboration, information obtained from various Port Authorities  
5.2 Port Institutions and Port Institutional Path development 
In this section we analyse the institutional development trajectory of each port through the lens 
of the presented Institutional Development path framework (figure 1). 
Namport (Namibia) 
In the case of Namibia, the port authority Namport was established through the Namibian Ports 
Authority Act (Act No. 2 of 1994). In addition to managing the port facilities, Namport also has a 
regulatory function to ‘contribute to the competitiveness of the SADC region's trade.’ The Port of 
Walvis Bay has strategically positioned itself as a ‘Gateway to Southern Africa’ and as such is 
committed to grow its future container volumes. The port is however quite constrained with 
respect to available land use for capacity expansion (for example). A current feasible option is a 
land reclamation project which comes at a significant cost to Namport (€235.35 million). This 
investment comprises around 23%6 of the country’s GDP recorded in 2011. As such this presents 
a considerable challenge to the balance sheet of Namport with respect to the financing of such a 
large scale investment. In addition to this investment is the cargo handling equipment and 
expertise to operate the expanded port. The current stage in the port’s life can be viewed as a 
critical juncture point in the institutional development path of Namport. This juncture point 
could present a window of opportunity for private/public partner participation to deliver the 
much needed financial investment and operational skills. A change in the institutional path can 
be achieved by e.g. unlocking Namport from the existing path or layering/stretching the current 
path (exercising plasticity) in order to achieve a more suitable institutional framework given the 
5 N$ 2.75 billion Namibian dollars, Uirab, 2012.  
6 GDP obtained from World bank development indicators, refer Worldbank, 2014  
  
                                                        
EJTIR 15(4), 2015, pp.506-535  520        
Fraser and Notteboom 
Institutional Development Paths in Seaports: The Southern African Case 
 
port’s objectives. This will ultimately depend on the level of regional resilience governing agents 
possess in order to unlock/stretch or layer Namport’s institutional path and shift it to a higher 
equilibrium yielding position. Currently, from a container operation perspective, Namport has 
the least institutionally evolved port compared with others in the region. The late start does 
however allow it to benefit from the experience of many other developing countries in port 
reform processes in order to select an option best suited to the port’s needs. The lock in trajectory 
of Namport however persists. During the last quarter of 2013 Namport secured a loan from the 
African Development bank in view of funding 87% of the container terminal expansion program. 
The difference will be funded through grants, retained earnings from Namport and the fiscus. 
MPA & TNPA (Mauritius and South Africa) 
The MPA and TNPA have been grouped in the discussion as they have an almost identical 
institutional framework. Both of the ports cusp between that of a public service and tool port. The 
major difference is that of the regulatory function. In the South African case, the regulator is a 
separate (although also public) entity. MPA, however, serves both the port authority and port 
regulatory function. The regulatory independence distinguishes the ports in terms of the degrees 
(tiers) of government involvement. These two port authorities also identify themselves as 
national strategic assets having a duty to serve and empower the citizens of the country through 
the employment of its local citizens and by supporting local small/medium enterprises. This is 
also one of the major reasons for the institutional lock in to the current port ownership model.  
With reference to our institutional path development framework (figure 1), we graphically 
illustrate and summarize the development path followed in South Africa highlighting critical 
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Figure 5.  Institutional development path of South Africa 
 
At juncture 1 (1.07 million TEU), South Africa underwent a political transition becoming an open 
democratic state in 1994. During this period, the ports were held and managed by a public entity 
controlling both the port authority and operator under one company, Portnet. At juncture 2, the 
authority and operator are separated into two divisions held within one holding company 
(Transnet). The promulgation of the National ports act in 2005 (juncture 3) thereafter established 
a separate and independent port regulator for the country. Much needed finances were required 
for capital investments in infrastructure to meet the demands for port services. The appointment 
of a new group Chief executive (Maria Ramos) resulted in a window of opportunity to divest 
non-core businesses held by the Transnet group, and fund much needed infrastructure 
development. Funding for further infrastructure expansion ahead of demand was subsequently 
achieved at juncture 5 in 2013 by exercising institutional plasticity. Remaining locked into the 
current institutional position (simply stretching it). With this institutional stretch, Transnet was 
able to find alternative means of funding (the sovereign bond market in local currency) while 
remaining within its current institutional path E2. 
Currently, the port authority and the port operator remain as separate divisions within one state-
owned enterprise, Transnet Soc. To regulate this state owned monopoly, the Port regulator of 
South Africa was established through the promulgation of ACT 12 of 2005 (the National Ports 
Act). Chapter 5, secs 29 established the regulator as an independent legal personality known as 
the Ports regulator. Secs 30 (1) of the Act prescribes the main functions of the port regulator 
namely to co-ordinate and harmonize the exercise of jurisdiction over economic regulation, 
equity of access to port facilities and monitoring activities of the port authority. Effectively this 
body seeks to generate outcomes similar to those which would be achieved had competition 
existed. The Ports regulator of South Africa has been most effective in curtailing the port 
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authority TNPA’s annual proposed tariff increases. (Reductions on TNPA proposed tariff 
increases 7 : 2013/14 proposed increase of 5.4% reduced by the regulator to -43.2% (export 
container) and -14.3% (full container). 2014/15 TNPA proposed average tariff increase of 14.39% 
reduced by the regulator to 5.9%). Other complaint matters include the mediation of disputes 
through the port regulator tribunal on matters relating to port property rental terms, preferential 
tariffs, provision of port access and port authority tender procedures. What the regulator has not 
succeeded at however is stimulating intra-port competition among South African ports. This 
could be a possibly more dynamic and market directed means of curtaining tariff increases, as 
well as increasing port service levels. The Act also puts TNPA in charge of regulating terminal 
operators the majority of which collectively form a division within the holding company of 
Transnet (Transnet port terminals). The divisional structure of the authority and operator 
belonging to the same holding company also presents a potential conflict of interest. This is 
compounded by the fact that the Act also currently has no provisions/mandate for the Port 
regulator to regulate port services operators.  
Since the democratisation in South Africa, Transnet has had the commitment of the national 
government (the company’s shareholder) to inject significant investments into the four container 
ports effectively making them the most sophisticated on the continent. This commitment has 
provided the resilience to remain on this institutional developmental path despite much pressure 
from port users to change it. Pressure to reform the current port institutional arrangement of the 
South African ports is due to the following five factors. Firstly, the capacity investment 
requirements (given the market demand strategy of the South African ports- port facilities and 
equipment) amount to €6.838 billion over the next seven years. The so-called Durban Dig-Out 
Project (DDOP), the plan to construct a large deepsea dock on the old Durban airport site, is 
considered as a critical project given the huge investment budget required (total estimated capital 
cost of 75 ZAR billion with phase 1 amounting to 37 ZAR billion). This places significant pressure 
on the holding group’s balance sheet as far as traditional funding sources are concerned. 
Secondly, there is some uncertainty with regards to whether the average return on total asset9 
(ROA) ratio yielded from the significant port investments over the last decade has been optimum. 
Coupled with that, actual capital investment10 (compared with budget) spending has been lower 
than anticipated. This can result in deferred expected future incremental cash flows on account of 
the late commissioning of assets. Third, there has been increased pressure from port users and 
the shareholder for greater operational port productivity. Productivity indicators such as moves 
per ship working hour, ship turn-around times and truck turn-around time have been lower than 
the target rates.11 Fourth, South Africa has the ambition to become a larger logistics turntable for 
sub-Saharan Africa. Sea-sea transshipment activities and inland corridor transport to West and 
East Africa should support this role. However, container shipping lines are keen to develop 
dedicated facilities in their respective hub ports. The current port institutional setting with TPT as 
the only container terminal operator does not create windows of opportunity for third parties 
(such as shipping lines) to enter the terminal operating business in South Africa (Notteboom, 
2010). Finally, market failure in the form of imperfect competition given that 99% of the container 
volumes nationally are handled by one company (Transnet) appears to enable some monopoly 
behavior particularly with respect to tariffs (i.e. terminal handling charges). These factors 
increase the pressure to rethink the current institutional arrangement and pursue meeting the 
current demands with private partners. The extent of the institutional shift on account of this 
critical juncture (i.e. an exercise in plasticity or radical reform) however remains to be seen. 
Negative sentiment towards privatisation still plagues the country and is fiercely contested by 
7  refer record of port regulator tarrif decisions, http://www.portsregulator.org/news/press-releases/ports-
regulator-tariff-decision-2014-2015 
8 79.8 ZAR billion South African rand, Transnet (2012:60) 
9 How effectively the port is converting the capital spend on assets invested into net income. A higher the ROA 
ratio, signals that the port company is earning more money on less investment spend. 
10 Transnet (2012:103) 
11 Transnet (2012:112) 
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the country’s largest and most influential labour union, the Congress of South African trade 
unions (COSATU). 
MPA, has achieved significant container volume growth over the past three years, particularly 
with respect to transshipment cargo and has committed itself to become a regional hub port 
(Fraser and Notteboom, 2012). To achieve this, the port will require further investments such as 
dredging works to at least 16.5 meters (in order to accommodate the 8000-15000 TEU vessels hub 
ports attract). Other investments include breakwater protection from the elements to the tropical 
island, increasing the port surface area and the reinforcement of the quay walls. These are a few 
port superstructure investments required. Financial injections in port handling equipment and 
technology to realize these initiatives will also be required. Again, this places a huge burden on 
the balance sheet of the government owned enterprise and a burden to the countries fiscal 
budget. In order to overcome this, the Mauritian government has already taken steps to obtain a 
strategic partner in its container operating division Cargo Handling Corporation (CHC)12 with 
the objective of increasing container traffic and contributing to the investment in port 
infrastructure and equipment.13 The international financial corporation (World Bank group) has 
confirmed its involvement in an advisory capacity concerning the sale of the Mauritius Port 
Authority’s 40% stake in the government owned CHC. A pre-bidding process was initiated in 
2009 and identified five organisations interested in the purchase of a 40% stake in CHC. At the 
final tender submission phase in April 2012, however, only one of the five organisations 
shortlisted in the pre-bidding phase submitted a tender. The Port Louis Maritime Employees 
Association (PLMEA) has expressed negative sentiments towards the ‘privatization’ of CHC 
vehemently opposing the restructuring initiative. Opposition from labour as well as the 
dominance of public involvement (60% majority shareholding following a concession agreement) 
have together driven a cooling of international investors who would prefer a more controlling 
stake in CHCL given the current economic climate.   Like Namport and TNPA, MPA’s 
institutional developmental path is at a critical juncture triggered by the need to obtain other 
sources of funding (the initiation of a PPP) for the port’s expansion program. A PPP can 
ultimately unlock the MPA out of its current pure public interest port lock-in development path 
and introduce private sector involvement for the first time in its terminal handing operations.  
POM (Mozambique) 
The Port of Maputo (POM) has achieved significant container volume growth during the 
country’s recovery from 15 years of civil war (Fraser and Notteboom, 2012). Inadequate and 
failing equipment, operational inefficiencies, market failure, a lack of skills (managerial and 
technical) and a lack of funding necessitated the first wave of port institutional changes to the 
port of Maputo in 1998. Fischer & Nhabinde (2012:25) detail the critical junctures (mainly 
political) which included a protracted concession process and also lead to the change in strategic 
partners. The current ownership structure of the port of Maputo (tier 4, figure 4) is on a much 
‘lower government involvement’ scale compared to the three ports discussed earlier. POM is 
unique in that the current structure has majority private equity shareholding on both the port 
authority (51%) and port operator (60%) level (i.e. Caminhos de Ferro Moçambique (CFM), the 
national rail and port operator is the government partner). Private sector port ownership was 
achieved after 5 years of negotiation and overcoming two 14 considerable challenges. Under 
Mozambican law, it is not possible for a private person or entity to own public land. This 
necessitated the drafting of new legislation (the drafting of a "special license") that would grant 
sufficient rights to the Maputo Port Development Corporation in order to be recognised and 
accepted by the Government of Mozambique. Ultimately this allowed MPDC to be registered 
12 The shareholders of the CHC are the government with 6% shares, the State Investment Corporation (54%) and 
the Mauritius Ports Authority (40%.) (All public) 
13 http://www.aptmauritius.com/local.php 
14 Refer Norris and Ogunbiyi (2003) for the complete list of challenges. 
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within the existing land registration system in Mozambique and provided the necessary comfort 
to lenders of the MPDC’s land ‘ownership’ security. 
SPAT (Madagascar) 
With reference to our institutional path development framework, we graphically illustrate and 
summarize the development path followed at Toamasina highlighting critical juncture events in 
figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Institutional development path of Toamasina 
 
At juncture 1, unsustainable low productivity and low volumes were generated at Toamasina 
which operated within a public service port institutional equilibrium path (E1). The election of a 
new market orientated government in 2002 (juncture 2) resulted in new privatization laws and 
property rights for foreign investors (juncture 3). This presented the opening of a window of 
opportunity for port investment which culminated in the conclusion of a private operator 
concession agreement and the shift to a new institutional equilibrium path (E2). 
At tier 5 (figure 4), the port of Toamasina is identified as a port structure with most private 
participation overall compared with the other ports in the region. Under this institutional 
arrangement, the port authority SPAT is a commercial company with a 51% government and 49% 
private share equity structure. The sector is regulated by government authority Agence Portuaire 
Maritime et Fluviale (APFM) which reports to the Ministry of Transport and has a delegated 
maritime administration mandate15. APFM is responsible for the tasks previously performed by 
the State (Ministry of Transport). These tasks included administration and regulation of the sub-
sector, supervision and control of the operation, defining and monitoring the implementation of 
15 Supervisory authority for port authorities; conceding authority for full concessions, see Turpin (2013) 
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policies, maintenance of waterways, and finally, operation, maintenance and improvement of 
maritime signaling along the coast of Madagascar. The main responsibilities of SPAT are 
concession assignments to private companies, permission for temporary occupation of the port 
area, management and maintenance of the port domain (access channel, etc.), port development 
and port security. SPAT obtains funds/lease fees from concessionaires and port dues on cargo 
and ships. With respect to container operations, this is managed by a 100% private international 
container operator, i.e. International Container Services Inc. Three major differences distinguish 
the Port Authority of Toamasina with the other ports in the region. 
Firstly, the ownership structure of port authorities distinguishes ‘main ports’ from ‘secondary’ 
ports. ‘Secondary ports’ are completely private port authorities (full concessions) whilst main 
ports like Toamasina are held by PPP port authorities such as SPAT. Secondly, the ‘main port’ 
structure is set up as a commercial entity with equity held by the public (in the majority) and the 
private sector in order to generate funding for port developments such as channel access 
(somewhat similar to the ownership structure of Maputo). Most port services (mooring, pilotage 
and towage) traditionally executed by Port Authorities are however conceded to private 
operators. SPAT therefore serves more an administrative role in ‘sub leasing’ port 
facilities/services (the main lease arose from APFM to SPAT) and developing/maintaining the 
larger scale port superstructure such as access channels. Third, unlike any of the other container 
ports in the region, Toamasina has a 100% privately devolved container terminal, managed by 
SPAT. The key factors driving port reform at Toamasina, like the other ports in the region hinged 
on finance for port development, port efficiency and technical skills. Like other port reform 
projects, the starting point was legislative reform which would permit the existence of an 
independent regulating authority and two types of port authorities. Notably, even though the 
port reform legislation was passed in 2003, the reform is still only partially implemented 
nationally. 
Summary of the Institutional Development Transitions 
Table 5 provides a summary of the institutional development paths of Southern African ports 
from the perspective of the presented theoretical framework (figure 1). The pre and post reform 
institutional paths are disclosed together with critical junctures which drove the reform process 
to begin with. The result (change column) identifies the nature of the institutional path trajectory 
change i.e. institutional path unlocking (resulting in a new path) or path plasticity 
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Table 5. Institutional Development Paths in container ports of Southern Africa   
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remains. 
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in  majority 51% 
private equity in the 
PA and 60% private 
equity holding of 
the PO.  
SPAT  










Un-locked on a 
New path. Result 
Public Private Port. 
 
Unlocking resulted 
in 49% private 
equity in the PA 
and 100% private 
holding of the PO. 
 
Source: Authors Own elaboration 
Comparison: Southern African and EU port Institutional positioning  
In order to gauge disparities between the institutional position of SA and EU ports in accordance 
with our port institutional positioning framework (figure 2), we first identify the degree of port 
ownership (public/private) at each port and assess the extent with which core port functions are 
separated from each port authority. The next step towards achieving this analysis is the provision 
of a port authority functional matrix which effectively discloses the degree of ownership 
(public/private) as well as identifies the body providing the regulatory, waterside operation, 
landlord and port cargo operation function of each port. For the purposes of a concise analysis, 
we have limited the waterside function to eight main functions within a port. These include 
towage, pilotage, dredging, mooring and port control. The location of services are termed to be 
either ‘inside’ (within the locks or inside the breakwater and bay) or ‘outside’ (behind the locks or 
outside the breakwater and bay).  
The results in table 6 demonstrate the relative consistency with respect to the institutional 
arrangements among the ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range in Europe (EU-HL). Notably, the 
16 PA : Port Authority 
17 PO : Port Operator 
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five EU-HL ports were selected from the same port range, the Hamburg-Le Havre range18 
(Notteboom, 2010) in an effort to avoid comparison disparities which could arise on account of 
comparing ports from different regional ranges. The Southern African ports although all located 
in the same region, have more varied institutional arrangements between them. Currently, no 
clear trend towards the same port path institutional ‘end state’ for all five ports in the region can 
be observed. Indeed, the Southern African case is a ‘late port reform mover’ compared to the 
European case and consequently there are obvious and significant differences in institutional 
arrangements between some ports. There are also however, some surprising similarities between 
selected EU-HL and some port institutional arrangements in Southern Africa. Some of these 
differences and similarities observed from the port authority functional matrix (table 6) are 
discussed below.  
Regarding the port regulation function, South Africa, Maputo and Toamasina have bodies other 
than the port authority performing the port regulatory function. As discussed in section 5.2 
(South African ports), this function is performed by a separate body in order to ensure there are 
no conflicts of interest given that the port authority and port operator are essentially divisions 
within one organisation (Transnet). Le Havre is the only EU-HL port most similar to Maputo and 
Toamasina in terms of the delegation of the port regulatory function to a body other than the port 
authority (Ministry).  In the case of Maputo and Madagascar, government entities (which also 
effectively have a shareholding in their respective port authority) are responsible for port 
regulations. Walvis Bay differs is this respect as the regulator function is carried out by the Port 
Authority but it’s regulatory authority is overseen by the Namibia Competition Commission 
(NaCC) 19  which has jurisdiction across the Port Authority with regard to competitive and 
regulatory issues. 
Further to the discussion in section 5.1 of Southern African Ports waterside function and cargo 
operations we note the following concerning EU-HL ports. Waterside functions are managed by 
the port authority which is primarily a corporatized body with municipal and/or government 
interest. Much of the core waterside services are outsourced to third party providers and the 
service level agreements are managed by the port authority. Pilotage outside of the locks in the 
case of the two Belgian ports analysed is provided by the Maritieme Dienstverlening en Kust 
(MDK) or Common Nautical Administration. For Hamburg, Rotterdam and Le Havre, all 
pilotage is conducted by Harbour Pilot Associations or co-operatives. These bodies also perform 
towage and mooring functions at some EU-HL ports (see table 6). The port cargo operation 
functions in the case of the EU-HL ports are entirely private and are permitted through 
concession agreements managed by the port authority. The concessionaires range from shipping 
lines, international container terminal operators as well as Joint Ventures between these two 
groups. The Southern African ports which most resemble these port functional arrangements are 
the port Maputo and to some extent, the port of Toamasina. At the Port of Maputo, many 
waterside functions are outsourced and in the case of Toamasina, there is a gradual withdrawal 
of a number of waterside services previously performed by the former public port authority.  The 
remaining three Southern African ports perform most of the critical waterside functions by their 




18 In Notteboom (2010) the theoretical rational behind port range segmentation for the EU-HL port range is 
provided.  
19 See Namibian Competition Commission : http://www.nacc.com.na/publications/research_papers.php 
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Table 6. Southern African & Northern European Port Functional matrix  







































Walvis Bay PA 
 
PA PA PA PA PA PAO MIN PA PA PA 
South Africa PR* PA PA PA PA PA PA MIN PA PA PO 
Port Louis PA 
 
PA PA PA PA PA PAO MIN PA PA PO# 
Maputo MIN 
 
PAO PAO PAO PAO PAO PAO MIN PA PA PO 
Toamasina MIN 
 





PA P PAO PAO MIN MIN PA PO 
Hamburg PA HPA HPA PAO PAO PAO PAO MIN PA PA PO 
Rotterdam PA HPC HPC PAO HPC HPA PAO MIN PA PA PO 
Le Havre MIN HPA HPA HPC PAO HPC PAO MIN PA PA PO 
Zeebrugge PA PAO ^MIN PAO P PAO PAO MIN MIN PA PO 
 
 Pure Public corporatized 
               Pure public corporate & Divisionalised 
 Pure public corporatized with PPP 
 PPP majority public holding 
 PPP majority private holding 
 Pure private 
 Government Ministry (MIN) 
PA  – Port Authority Function                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
PAO – Port Authority Outsourced function                     
PO -  Port Operator Divisionalised/ Under concession                             
PUCO – Public Co-operative                          
P -  Private Company                                  
HPA/C -  Harbour Pilots Association/Cooperation                                      
PR  – Port Regulator # Concession/private partnership under consideration   
^Maritieme Dienstverlening en Kust (MDK). The Common Nautical Administration (CNA)  ▫Port 
regulations are adopted by the Transport Ministry throught the National Ports Act 1994, enforced by the 
National Port Authority.  
Note: Dredging within the bay in South Africa is done in house by the TNPA’s fleet of dredgers. Service level 
agreements guide the scope of dredging work required at each port, which is approved by in house Port Engineers. 
Major dredging work for expansion projects beyond the capacity of the fleet is outsourced. 
 
  
EJTIR 15(4), 2015, pp.506-535  529 
Fraser and Notteboom 
Institutional Development Paths in Seaports: The Southern African Case 
 
The aggregated findings which were derived from the overall ownership and functional 
appraisal for EU-HL and Southern African ports is presented in figure 7 in accordance with the 
port reform positioning framework outlined in figure 2. The X axis represents an aggregated 
position of the extent of each port’s level of public involvement in the regulator, marine 
waterside and operator functions. The Y axis represents an aggregated position demonstrating 
the extent to which regulator, marine waterside and operator functions are being carried out by 
the Port Authority directly (extent of functional separation from the Port Authority itself). We 
note the following salient findings with reference to figure 7: 
 
 
Figure 7.  SA & EU-HL Port Institutional Positioning framework 
• There is a much greater level of institutional variation between Southern African ports 
compared with the extent of institutional variation observed within the EU-HL range of 
ports. The extent of this is illustrated in more detail in table 6 (port functional matrix).  
• Port Louis and South African and Namibian ports all hold the same lock in position 
institutionally (public ownership institutional path lock in) and as such are placed in close 
proximity in figure 7 based on their respective aggregated port ownership and port 
authority functional results. Namport represents the extreme of this institutional position 
and resides below the 10% mark in terms of the extent of functional separation of services 
from the PA. 
• The ports in the EU-HL range overall are positioned very similarly with the exception of 
the port of Le Havre. The gap in the aggregated institutional position between the Port of 
Le Havre and the rest of the EU-HL ports (A) is on account of the regulator function. In 
France port regulations are adopted by the government at national level and managed by 
the General Regulations for Commercial and Fishing Seaports Department (Règlement 
général de police dans les ports maritimes de commerce et de pêche) and not the port 
authority as is the case with the rest of the selected EU ports. The difference illustrates 
overall greater segregation of functions away from the port authority level at Le Havre 
compared to other EU-HL ports. However, the extent of government involvement is 
positioned at almost the same level (X axis).  
A 
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• EU-HL ports display the most balance in terms of devolution of port authority 
administrative and operational functions and ownership diversity in terms of public and 
private sector involvement (positioned closest to centre).  
• Two of the smaller Southern African ports (i.e. Port of Maputo and Toamasina) which are 
currently the poorer and least developed, most resemble the EU-HL range ports 
(particularly Le Havre). This similarity is mainly on account of the alignment of port 
authority functions. With respect to ownership however, Maputo and Toamasina are 
positioned in areas with less government ownership (particularly at the port authority 
level) and as such are positioned further left on the X axis compared with EU-HL ports. 
• Finally, with respect to the involvement of the local city municipality, the EU-HL port city 
municipalities (apart from Le Havre 20 ) each have an ownership interest in their 
respective port authorities. Southern African ports however are corporatized authorities 
listed either as a (wholly or partially) state owned enterprise reporting directly to a 
government ministry or private company shareholders. 
6. Discussion 
Southern African nations (South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Madagascar and Mauritius) have 
only since 1960 established themselves as independent countries. These transformations were 
often followed with second, third or fourth waves of political transformation. As such, these 
uncertainties and in some cases political shocks affected economic and social policies in the 
region. This ultimately also affected the institutions guiding port use and port development. 
Given the relatively low maturity of Southern African states as independent nations, political and 
economic vulnerability remains a significant threat to the quest for an institutional equilibrium. 
In building this capability, resilience is a critical imperative for a balanced port institutional 
development path. 
From the analysis of the five port authorities, we have distinguished different tier levels of port 
institutional positioning determined by the extent of government involvement and segregation of 
duties/functions. An interesting observation is that the more developed/mature economies in 
the region appear to have the least amount of institutional reform. Namibia, South Africa and 
Mauritius are government held and regulated ports locked into the pure public port ownership 
model. Mozambique and Madagascar, two poorer and less developed countries, have more 
innovative port authority ownership structures and have undergone the most reform in the 
region. From this one can conclude that the market failure in these countries was so severe that 
government had to seek alternative mechanisms in order to finance the mass capital investments 
and improve operational efficiencies. Notably however, the governments of these two countries 
did not opt for total privatisation and sought a more balanced level of public and private 
participation within their respective port authorities. The tier 1 to 3 countries now also appear to 
have reached or are close to reaching a level of ‘self-investment fatigue’ which their respective 
balance sheets and government fiscal budgets can no longer sustain. This has increased the 
pressure to refocus the port authorities (possibly fully or partially devolving cargo operations) or 
to seek private equity partnerships. This is evident in the case of Mauritius, and has resulted in 
an (ongoing) sale process of the Port Louis Port Authority’s 40% stake in the country’s public 
container port operator CHC. Labour in South Africa, Namibia and Mauritius’s vehement 
opposition towards privatization or public private partnerships serve as one of the other major 
anchors holding these ports in their public lock in positions. This was particularly evident at Port 
20 The Grand Port Maritime du Havre is a public institution overseeing administrative public service tasks. It is 
operated as a public institution responsible for the management of all port facilities in its district. It is run by a 
Management Board of four members. Its surveillance council is composed of State representatives, employees, 
territorial community (Upper Normandy, Seine Maritime, CODAH and Le Havre) and the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. (refer http://www.havre-port.fr/en/) 
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Louis. The Port Louis Maritime Employees Association’s (PLMEA) held negative sentiments 
towards the partial privatization of the CHC container terminal operation. Opposition from 
labour as well as the dominance of public involvement (60%21 public shareholding in the port 
operator would remain following a 40% sale) has together driven a cooling of international 
investors who would prefer a more controlling stake in CHCL given the current economic 
climate. Unlocking the current institutional lock in position (for the purposes of alternative 
funding mechanisms for example) could unleash new funding windows of opportunity for these 
three ports. South Africa’s Transnet on the other hand, maintaining their public port ownership 
lock in stance, have soured funding through the sovereign bond22 market. This debt instrument is 
planned to finance its port expansion programme and was issued as the first African local-
currency issuance on international capital markets. For now, the South African port authority has 
managed to potentially diversify its funding alternatives without unlocking its current 
institutional arrangements. For Namport, the acquisition of a $2,982 billion loan from the African 
Development bank in 2013, together with government grants (to fund the balance) in order to 
finance the Walvis Bay container terminal development firmly hold the Namport Authority in its 
public port lock in path trajectory.    
In their study of the freight rate practices of shipping lines on the Far-East and South Africa trade 
routes, Chen et al. (2013) demonstrate that higher sea freight rates are applied by shipping lines 
on the Asia-South Africa trade. The authors cite the overcharge as a premium for business and 
operational risks. In consideration of port reform with (possible) consequential international 
investment, a politically stable, legitimate and responsive state is an imperative precursor for less 
risky international private investment. Based on current Worldbank governance indicators, 
political instability, social inequality and corruption however still plague much of the region 
today and this could have a significant impact on the number of potentially willing risk averse 
investors interested in investing in Southern African ports where institutionally possible.  
7. Conclusions  
This paper provided the theoretical motives for institutional port reform and disclosed the level 
of port institutional variation among southern African ports and a range of European ports. From 
the case study, we observed the need for investment funding as one of the primary motives for 
institutional reform. Greater operational efficiencies, strategic fit and market failure (with respect 
to competition mainly) were other port reform drivers. The overall assumption of our study was 
that a port will always seek a higher port institutional equilibrium development path. However, 
a port is often ‘locked in’ to a development path by various factors. These lock in factors include 
political, economic and legal constructs which can keep a port from moving towards a higher 
equilibrium yielding position. Unlocking Southern African ports from their respective 
institutional development paths has occurred or will be taking place at critical junctures (e.g. 
seeking investment finance and international technical skills) which have proven reasonably 
successful where the reform occurred. The result for Maputo and Mozambique (where major port 
reform occurred) has been the introduction of innovative port authority ownership structures 
which reopened the port reform discussion for the other ports in the region. 
Zooming in on the most prolific reason for institutional reform in the region, i.e. the funding for 
port development, we conclude the following. From the recent funding mechanisms employed 
by the publically locked in South African, Namibian and Mauritian ports, it is clear that this 
position will not be relinquished in the near future. Ultimately, Southern African ports are 
following their own port institutional development path in the midst of pressure to follow a first 
21 State Investment Corporation Limited -54%; and the Government of Mauritius - 6% 
22 Bonds - Funding is sourced in the bond market and is disclosed as debt for the borrower. This strategy in the 
case of a public port allows the port to obtain funding without changing the equity (ownership structure). 
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world/developed country intuitional ‘example’. But is ‘public ownership lock in’ an altogether 
bad phenomenon? Should Southern African port institutions mirror those more mature world 
ports? Analysing the expansion track record and container throughput growth of the ‘publically 
locked in’ ports over the last 15 years reveals a tremendous commitment to port growth from 
each of these three governments. Each country has undergone large scale investments at their 
respective ports and is committed to utilizing these state assets in order to aid economic 
development within the region. South Africa’s port investment motives in particular went 
beyond a purely profit motivation and included a broader economic development approach. This 
was evident in the development of the deep water transshipment Port of Nctqura. The Nctqura 
(greenfield) port development was deliberately located at one of the poorest regions in the 
county, the Eastern Cape. This was done in order to boost economic activity in that region. Such 
an ‘uncertain’ port investment would have been less likely for a purely profit motivated business 
interest investor (see also Notteboom, 2011). A port more closely positioned to the country’s main 
corridors and closer to Durban for example would have been most likely selected. After an 
uncertain start in 2009, public commitment has helped propel this port to become the fastest 
growing container terminal in the world (Drewry, 2013).   
For these port authorities, remaining locked into the ‘public interest asset notion’ of a port, will 
make the funding of future expansion increasingly challenging given the scale of port projects. 
Debt, whether in the form of loans or perhaps the sale of bonds will always be subject to 
borrowing limits and finance costs for the lender and (in the case of bonds) higher yield 
requirements for investors.   
There is scope for future quantitative research which builds further on this work beyond the 
extent of institutional variation by analysing the drivers of institutional change in Southern 
African ports. Firstly, there is room for a study analysing ‘the cost of lock-in’. This study would 
assess the (cost) efficiency of publicly funded loans/debt instruments used for container 
expansion projects relative to other ungeared sources of funding (such as private participation 
through share offering for example). Such a quantitative financial analysis would empirically 
assess if the institutional lock in position of certain ports leads to overall higher financing costs 
for the port authority and public sector. A second area of further research could lie in a 
quantitative post reform audit review. Such a study would assess the achievability of the 
expectations (financial and operational) of investors subsequent to a port institutional change or 
stretch. The results of which could clearly guide policy makers by quantitatively highlighting 
under which institutional transition, the greatest financial and operational results were realized 
given the country specific context. A third opportunity for further research lies in the exploration 
of the contentious issue of institutional reform causality as highlighted by Chang (2012) (refer 2.2; 
efficiency). This study would explore of the impact which institutional reform has had on 
Southern Africa port productivity, specifically identifying the causal relationship (if any) between 
the two. Doing so would entail the development of an academically sound research tool used to 
identify causality in port institutional reform programs of cases where the reform was initiated in 
order to achieve greater port productivity.   
Finally with regard to our conclusory remark which questioned the negative sentiment towards 
‘public ownership lock, scope for further research exists to explore the possible benefits which 
may exists from port institutional lock in. 
Reference 
Arthur, W. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and ‘lock-in’ by historical events. 
Economic Journal 99, 116–131. 
Baird, A. (2004). Public goods and the public financing of major European seaports. Maritime Policy 
and Management 31 (4), 1-17. 
  
EJTIR 15(4), 2015, pp.506-535  533 
Fraser and Notteboom 
Institutional Development Paths in Seaports: The Southern African Case 
 
Bank, A. D. (2013). The New Port of Walvis Bay Container Terminal Project. Tunis: African Development 
Bank. 
Boschma, R., & Koen, F. (2009). Some Notes on Institutions in Evolutionary Economic Geography. 
Economic Geography Volume 85, Issue 2, 151–158. 
Brooks, M. (2004). The governance structure of ports. Review of Network Economics 3, 168-183. 
Brooks, M. (2004). The Governance Structure of Ports. Review of Network Economics, 168-183. 
Brooks, M. (2007). Devolution, Port Governance and Port Performance. Research in Transport Economics 
17, 599-629. 
Brooks, M., & Pallis, A. (2008). Assessing port governance models: process and performance 
components. Maritime Policy & Management:35:4, 411-432. 
Chang, H. (2011). Institutions and economic development:theory, policy and history. Journal of 
Institutional Economics 7:4, 473–498. 
Chen, T., Lee, P., & Notteboom, T. (2013). Shipping line dominance and freight rate practices on trade 
routes: the case of the Far East-South Africa trade. Int. J. Shipping and Transport Logistics, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
155-173. 
Cheon, S., Dowall, D., & Song, D. (2010). Evaluating impacts of institutional reforms on port efficiency 
changes:Ownership, corporate structure, and total factor productivity changes of world container 
ports. Transportation Research Part E 46 , 546–561. 
Cullinane, K., & Song, D. (2002). Port privatisation principles and practice. Transport Reviews 22, 55–75. 
David, P. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY . American Economic Review 75, 332–337. 
David, P. (1994). 'Why are institutions the carriers of history?' Path dependence and the evolution of 
conventions, organizations and institutions. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, vol. 5, no. 2, 
205:220. 
David, P. (2005). The Evolutionay Foundations of Economics. In K. Dopfer, Path Dependence in 
economic processes: implications for policy analysis in dynamical systems context (pp. 151-194). Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
De Langen, P., & Van der Lugt, L. (2007). Governance structures of Port Authorities in the 
Netherlands. Research in Transport Economics 17, 109-137. 
Debrie, J., Gouvernal, E., & Slack, B. (2007). Port devolution revisited: the case of regional ports and 
the role of lower tier governments. Journal of Transport Geography 15, 455–464. 
Debrie, J., Lavaud-Letilleul, V., & Parola, F. (2013). Shaping port governance: the territorial trajectories 
of reform. Journal of Transport Geography, 56–65. 
European Sea Ports Organisation & Verhoeven, P. (2011). European Port Governance: Report of an enquiry 
into the current governance of European Seaports. Brussels: ESPO. 
Farlam, P. (2005). Assessing Public-Private Partnerships in Africa. Pretoria: South African Institute of 
International Affairs. 
Farrell, S. (2013). Ports Regulation : Global Experience and its Applicability to South Africa. London: Sheila 
Farrell and Associates. 
Fischer, R., & Nhabinde, V. (2012). Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships in Mozambique (Working 
paper). London: International Growth Centre. 
Fraser, D., & Notteboom, T. (2012). Gateway and hinterland dynamics: The case of the Southern 
African Port System. African Journal of Business Management Vol.6 (44), 10807-10825. 
Gertler, M. (2004). Manufacturing Culture: The Institutional Geography of Industrial Practice. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
  
EJTIR 15(4), 2015, pp.506-535  534 
Fraser and Notteboom 
Institutional Development Paths in Seaports: The Southern African Case 
 
Grant, R. (2009). Contemporary Strategy Analysis. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
Hall, P. (2003). Regional Institutional Convergence? Reflections from the Baltimore Waterfront. 
Economic Geography 79(4), 347-363. 
Hill, E., Wial, H., & Wolman, H. (2008). Exploring Regional Economic Resilience. Working Paper 2008-
04, Institute of Urban and Regional Development. 
Hodge, G., & Carsten, G. (2007). Public–Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review. 
Public Administration Review 67, no 3, 545-558. 
Hoffman, J. (2002). Latin American ports: results and determinants of private sector participation. 
International Journal of Maritime Economics, 221–241. 
Jacobs, W., & Notteboom, T. (2011). An evolutionary perspective on regional port systems: The role of 
windows of opportunity in shaping seaport. Environment and Planning A 2011, volume 43,, 1674 -1692. 
Lee, T. (1999). Using Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Mackinnon, D., Cumbers, A., Pike, A., Birch, K., & Mcmaster, R. (2009). Evolution in economic 
geography: institutions, political economy and adaptation. Economic Geography 85 (2), 129–150. 
Marlow, P., & Paixa˜, A. (2003). Measuring lean ports’ performance. International. International Journal 
of Transport Management, 1(4), 189–202. 
Martin, R., & Simmie, J. (2008). Path dependence and local innovation systems in city regions. 
Innovation: Management, Policy and Practice 10 (2–3), 183–196. 
Martin, R., & Sunley, P. (2006). Path dependence and regional economic evolution. Journal of Economic 
Geography 6 , 395–437. 
Mintzberg, H. (1990). The design school: Reconsidering the basic premises of strategic management. 
Strategic Management Journal, 11(3), 171–195. 
Mouton, J. (2001). How to succeed in your Maters and Doctoral Studies: A South African Guide and Resource 
book. Pretoria: Van Schaik. 
Niekerk, H. (2005). Port Reform and Concessioning in Developing Countries. Maritime Economics and 
Logistics, 141-155. 
Norris, S., & Ogunbiyi, C. (2003). Letting the crown jewels fall into private hands: A case study of the 
Maputo Port Project. Journal of Structured and Project Finance Vol. 9, Iss. 2, 47. 
North, D. (1991). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Notteboom, T. (2010a). From multi-porting to a hub port configuration: the South African container 
port system in transition. International Journal of Shipping and Transport Logistics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 224-245. 
Notteboom, T. (2010b). Concentration and the formation of multi-port gateway regions: An update. 
Journal of Transport Geography 18, 567-583. 
Notteboom, T., & Winkelmans, W. (2001). Reassessing Public Sector Involvement in European 
Seaports. International Journal of Maritime Economics 3, 242-259. 
Notteboom, T., De Langen, P., & Jacobs, W. (2013). Institutional plasticity and path dependence in 
seaports: interactions between institutions, port governance reforms and port authority routines. 
Journal of Transport Geography 27, 26-35. 
Roland, G. (2004). Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions. 
Studies in Comparative International Development,Vol. 38, No. 4,, 109-131. 
Setterfield, M. (1993). A model of institutional hysteresis. Journal of Economic Issue 27, 755–774. 
Simmie, J., & Martin, R. (2010). The economic resilience of regions: towards an evolutionary approach. 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 3, 27-43. 
  
EJTIR 15(4), 2015, pp.506-535  535 
Fraser and Notteboom 
Institutional Development Paths in Seaports: The Southern African Case 
 
Strambach, S. (2010). Path Dependence and path plasticity: the co-evolution of institutions and 
innovation- the German customized buisiness software industry. In R. Boschma, & R. Martin, The 
Handbook of Evolutionary Economic Geography (pp. 406-429). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Suykens, F., & Van De Voorde, E. (1998). A quarter of a century of port management in Europe: 
objectives and tools. Maritime Policy and Management 25, 251-261. 
Thomas, B. (1994). Privatisation of UK seaports. Maritime Policy and Management 21, 135–148. 
Tongzon, J., & Ganesalingam, S. (1994). Evaluation of ASEAN port performance and efficiency. Asian 
Economic Journal, 8(3), 317–330. 
Transnet Soc. (2012). Transnet Annual Report. Johannesburg: Transnet. 
Turpin, F. (2013). PPP in ports, landlord port model. Logistics Processes and Motorways of the Sea II (pp. 
38-49). Tbilisi: EGIS International. 
Uirab, B. (2012, June 13). Namport Gearing for growth. (S. Sasman, Interviewer) 
Van den Berg, R., & De Langen, P. (2011). Hinterland strategies of port authorities: A case study of the 
port of Barcelona. Research in Transportation Economics 33, 6-14. 
van Niekerk, H. (2002). Ports restructuring, policy and regulation: The South African case. International 
Association of Maritime Economists (pp. 1-18). Panama: IAME. 
Venkatraman, N. (1989). The concept of fit in strategy research: Toward verbal and statistical 
correspondence. Academy of Management Review, 14(3), 423–444. 
Vining, A., & Boardman, A. (2008). The potential role of public–private partnerships in the upgrade of 
port infrastructure: normative and positive considerations. Maritime Policy & Management 35:6, 551-569. 
Worldbank. (2007). Port Reform Toolkit. Washington DC: Worldbank. 
Worldbank. (2014, January 21). World Data Bank. Retrieved January 21, 2014, from The World Bank: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx# 
Yin, V. (1994). Case study research: design and methods. London: Sage 
  
